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Abstract
This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (pub-
lic organization) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity.
In the model, workers within the organization can have different identities. We develop
a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility
of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model,
identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort.
We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the
organizational objectives and views herself as a part of the organization. Contrary, we
use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and
frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that the principal can
include investments to foster identity in contracts. Think for instance in developing a
single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization.
We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’
identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organizations.
Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of
incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational
capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better
in the short run.
Keywords: contracts, moral hazard, identity, socialization, mission, motivational capital.
JEL Codes: D03, D86.
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1 Introduction
The present work deals with incentives and workers’ motivations in public organizations.
Organizations that provide collective goods pursue goals and objectives, which are not
necessarily monetary profitable. Usually the motivation of the employees who work within
these organizations goes beyond the expected monetary gain. In general terms people who
work in the provision of collective goods sector have a self-view as a pro-social agents. They
share organizational goals and objectives and thus they cohere with managers and policy
makers in what Wilson [31] called mission.
A “mission” is a single culture that is widely and enthusiastically shared by the
members of the organization. Wilson (1989, p. 99)
Bureaucrats have preferences. Among them is the desire to do the job. That
desire may spring entirely out of a sense of duty, or it may arise out of a willingness
to conform to the expectations of fellow workers and superiors even when there is no
immediate financial advantage in doing so. Wilson (1989, p. 156).
If motivations beyond the monetary contribute in drawing the way of public workers’
behavior, then non-monetary incentives should be incorporated to motivate them. In many
of the most productive firms there have been attempts to substitute monetary incentives
with the culture of mission [31].
In business where one might suppose that money incentives are the whole story,
great efforts have been made by the most productive firms to supplement those incen-
tives with a sense of mission based on a shared organizational culture. Wilson (1989,
157).
Then, mission preferences and other non-monetary or non-economic workers’ motiva-
tions might lead them to high quality work, high degree of implication, effort culture, and
identification with the organization’s objectives.
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In line with Wilson’s [31] approach, Kreps [19] in the 90’s leaded a new branch of
the literature on organizational theory named Corporate Culture. In his seminal work,
Kreps [19], treats the corporate culture as a principle that helps to identify the firm’s rule
of behavior. The rule helps in setting a good reputation that may be used to generate
confidence to potential future trading partners. In Kreps’s [19] words, culture “[. . . ] gives
hierarchical inferiors an idea ex-ante how the organization will react to circumstances as
they arise; in strong sense, it gives identity to the organization.”.
Other relevant works from Corporate Culture literature1 also have approached the ques-
tion of how a good culture, shared by all the members of an organization, may be a powerful
motivator different from the monetary rewards.
In his highly influential work, Akerlof and Kranton [1] consider this sharing-goals behav-
ior of agents as Identity. In their words, identity, is “a way to motivate employees, different
than incentives from monetary compensation” and also believe that “[. . . ] a change in iden-
tity is the ideal motivator if, [. . . ] the effort of a worker is either hard to observe or hard
to reward”.
Identity in economics and organizations and public workers’ motivation have is an issue
in the recent economic literature 2. Identity may alter the economic behavior of workers’
because it acts as a workers’ internal non-material motivator. Thus, in the provision of
collective goods where workers’ self-view as pro-social agents plays an important role, the
design of optimal incentives may differ from the private sector where the weight of economic
motives is higher.
Identity is related with person’s self-image. How people think about they and the others
should behave [29], [1, 2]. In a organization, identity, is the degree in which agents share
organizational goals and objectives. At public organizational level, identity is a measure of
1Barney [4], Schein [28], Crémer [11], Lazear [20], Tirole [30], Carrillo and Gromb [9, 10], Hermalin [18]
and, Rob and Zemsky [27]
2The effects of identity on economic decisions have been analyzed also by Sen [29], Wilson [31], Akerlof
and Kranton [1, 2], Besley and Ghatak [8], Ghatak and Mueller [17] and Prendergast [24, 25].
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how accurately workers identify themselves with the organization mission or goal of provid-
ing social valuable goods. Identity is the internalization of a culture by all the members of
an organization and culture can be seen as the organizational goal or mission.
Our work integrates the concept of culture within identity. Identity means that workers’
share organizational goals. Culture, in the present work, reflects to a situation in which
identity becomes into a stable rule of behavior for all the members of the organization:
to behave pro-socially exerting high effort at workplace. Thus identity can lead all the
members of an organization to a high effort in oder to produce and provide society with
socially valuable goods and services.
The economic literature have analyzed the role of workers’ identity and its consequences
within firms. But economics has not explain how this identity affects to organizational out-
comes and decisions when the organization (principal) may alter workers’ (agents) identity.
There is a lack of research that incorporates the process of changing identity principal-agent
games. In Akerlof and Kranton [1] for instance, they point out the possibility of changing
agents identity as a way that allows organizations to get economic benefits. But authors,
neither formalize this process nor incorporate it into their model.
Trying to move a step forward from the literature we propose a model in which workers’
identity may be altered as a result of socialization. Socialization is the process through which
organizations can change workers’ identity. As a result of socialization workers’ and organi-
zation’s goals and objectives get aligned. By contrast, conflict will be the process that lead
workers to be completely disagree from organizational goals. Socialization can be launched
by organization’s managers carrying out certain investments and actions which promote a
sense of mission, shared culture, or common objectives through and among workers. This
approach allow us to measure what Akerlof and Kranton [1] call as motivational capital.
That is, the current value of the stream of the expected costs saved by the organization
when principal invests a given amount of resources to improve workers’ identity. Once we
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measure this value of the motivational capital we can establish the conditions under which
Firms and organizations might benefit from investing in motivational capital.
The present work analyzes the effects of workers’ identity in the economics of organiza-
tions. We are particularly interested in public organizations whose principal activity is the
provision of collective goods such as education, health, civil safety, social work, etc. Can
workers’ identity be considered another productive asset of public organizations? If so, how
should public organizations’ managers design incentive schemes in order to benefit from this
Motivational Capital? Then, could identity be the key to avoid shirking in public organi-
zations? In order to answer these questions we incorporate into a principal-agent model,
the possibility to influence public workers’ (agents) identity with the use of incentives. We
assume that including some motivational investments in contracts, public organizations may
affect positively their employees’ identity.
2 The Model
We want to analyze the optimality of contracts in a principal agent model in which the prin-
cipal may provoke changes in agents’ identity through incentives and identity investments.
We want to capture in the model whether the possibility of changing agents’ identity may
influence optimal incentive contracts. In the present section of the paper we define the game
and we solve it. Then we make comparative statics to draw some interesting results.
2.1 Players’ Preferences and Utilities.
There are two players in the game: the agent A and the principal P3. We assume that A
can develop identity. We also restrict the analysis to linear contracts.
3Often we use she and he to refer to the agent and the principal respectively, as conventionally the
principal agent literature does.
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We model a finite period t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... principal-agent dynamical game where the
agents’ effort is private information. Agents’ behaviour is affected by identity. We incorpo-
rate identity into A’s utility function. Identity is a non-monetary source of motivation that
affects agents’ preferences. Identity also can be altered or changed by principal’s choices.
2.1.1 Principal
In our model there is a performance measure qt that P wants to optimize in each t =
0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . . Performance qt is a function of As’ effort et ∈ {e, e}. Assume that
qt ∈ {q, q} where q > q; interpret q as P ’s target on performance level and q as a fail
in this target. Let p(qt = q|et) = θi be the probability of high performance conditional
to A’s effort choice. We use i = 0, 1 to label low and high effort: 0 means low effort e
and 1 means high effort e. Then p(qt = q|et = e) = θ1 will be the probability of high
performance when the agent decides to exert high effort, and p(qt = q|et = e) = θ0 the
probability of high performance when the agent decides to exert low effort. Alternatively
p(qt = q|et = 1) = 1 − θ1 and p(qt = q|et = e) = 1 − θ0 will be the probabilities of low
performance when effort is high and low respectively. We assume that performance qt is an
informative but noisy signal of et which means that θ1 > θ0.
The principal may use monetary incentives −“carrots and sticks”− or non-monetary
incentives −“identity investments”− to maximize qt or performance. We assume that, re-
gardless agents shirk or not, P always expects higher profit from high performance level.
Formally,
θi
(
Rt(qt)− ws0t
)
> (1− θi)
(
Rt(qt)− w
s0
t
)
where s0 = {0, S} and i = {0, 1}.
Despite qt is a target outcome for P it is not necessarily the only one for A. This condition of
disconnection may be the reason for using incentives in order to achieve high performance.
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Let Rt(qt) be a function which assigns a monetary value to the performance level4. Rt(qt)
is positively correlated with the achieved social welfare, the total amount of the collective
good or service delivered, and the sort of measures which are salient and observable by
the electorate, tax payers and political advisors to evaluate the public supply of collective
goods.
Let E[Rt(qt)|θi] be the expected material rewards for P . Rewards depend on performance
qt. Performance is conditional to θi. Let wt(qt) be the monetary payments offered by P
to A. Payments are contingent to performance. Let E[wt(qt)|θi] be the expected monetary
payment that P offers to A which is also an expected monetary cost for P . Let s0 be the
total amount of resources invested to promote and change A’s identity. Like any other
investment, we assume that P faces an initial investment cost of C0 = {0, S} at t = 0. If
P decides to make identity investments s0 = S, he will face the future depreciation cost of
such investments in the following periods. We capture this depreciation cost stream with
the cost function Ct(s0).
All the above describes P ’s expected profit function Πt for each period t that can be
written as,
Πt = E[Rt(qt)|θi, υt]− E[wt(qt)|θi, υt]− Ct(s0) (2.1)
In equation 2.1 the cost function Ct(s0) takes the value C0(S) = S in t = 0 and an depreci-
ation cost Ct(S) = γS for every t > 1 at constant depreciation rate γ.
4Usually for the firm this monetary value is determined by the market price and the quantity sold. But
in the case of the public provision of collective goods the absence of markets and market prices makes hard
to measure the monetary value of qt. We can interpret this function as one which calculate the opportunity
cost of public supplying rather than market supplying
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2.1.2 Agent
We represent the A’s preferences with the following expected utility function.
Ut = E[ut(wt(qt))|θi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected utility from income
− ψt(et,
Identity︷ ︸︸ ︷
υt(s0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Disutility from effort
(2.2)
The first term on the right hand side of the above utility function, E[ut(wt(qt))|θi], is
the expected utility from money. The agent is risk averse, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and the
parameter θi is the probability of high or low performance.
The second term on the right hand side of the expected utility function represents the
disutility from effort ψt(et, υt(s0)). The disutility from effort depends positively on effort
and negatively on υt(s0) which is a function representing A’s identity. The properties of the
disutility from effort are summed up in the following set of assumptions.
A1: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is continuous in the interval [υ, υ].
A2: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is strictly decreasing in its second argument
when et = e. That is, ∂ψt(e,υt)∂υt |et=e < 0.
A3: When et = e, then ψt(e, υt) = 0; ∀υt ∈ [υ, υ].
A4: The function ψt(et, υt(s0)) is bounded below and above. Is bounded below when ψt(e, υt) =
0 ∀υt, and ψt(e, υ) = 0. The function is bounded above when ψt(e, υ) = Ψ, with
Ψ ∈ R+.
The above assumptions ensure that, when identity converge to its upper (lower) bound,
then A’s disutility from doing high effort converges to zero (Ψ). That is, the agent does not
suffer disutility from exerting high effort when she develops identity. Contrary, when she
has no identity, A experiences the maximum disutility from effort and she only can diminish
this disutility making low effort.
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2.1.3 Agent’s Identity: Information
At the first period of the game, P learns As’ identity probability distribution F0(υ0)5. P ’s
action over s0 affects the A’s identity. Then, conditional to his identity investment choice
s0 = {0, S}, P have to update the As’ identity distribution Ft(υt|s0) in the subsequent
periods of the game t = 1, ..., T, ... where t ∈ N.
2.2 The Game
The game is a repeated game with two players: the agent A, and the principal P . We
consider a recontracting game in which every period both players have to play again: P
must offer a new contract and A’s has to accept or reject the contract and choose effort
level. We analyze this repeated principal agent game with moral hazard, where the choices
made by the P affects A’s identity. Reciprocally these changes in identity and motivation
affect the contracts offered by P in the next period.
2.2.1 Timing
Each period the game consists of three stages: stage 0, stage 1, and stage 2. The sequence
of these stages in t = 0, 1, 2, ... is graphically shown in figure 1.
The sequence of stages within each period t = 0, 1, 2, ... is as described below:
(0): The principal P learns the distribution of As’ identity F0(υ0) in t = 0 or updates
As’ identity distribution Ft(υt|s0) in t = 1, 2, ... taking into account his choice of s0 ∈ {0, S}
in t = 0. Then, P offers a contract conditional to the expected value of A’s identity. The
contract consists in a dupla of stochastic contingent payments w0(q0) = {w,w} and the
decision to invest or not in socialization s0 ∈ {0, S} in t = 0: {w0(q0), s0}. In t = 1, 2, . . .
5We consider a continuum of types of A, υt ∈ [υ, υ] There is a possibility of switching As’ type or identity
making an investment in the starting period of the game. For a precise description of the time evolution of
the conditional distribution of types see the mathematical appendix.
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Figure 1: The timing of the game in two separate sequences, t = 0 and t = 1, 2, ...
a contract consists in a dupla of stochastic contingent payments wt(qt) = {w,w} and the
commitment of bearing the cost of depreciation of the s0 ∈ {0, S} investment, Ct(s0) = γs0.
We refer to this contract with {wt(qt), Ct(s0)}.6
(1): A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then choose an action over effort
e0 ∈ {e, e}. Contrary, if she refuses then she gets her reservation utility U .
(2): Finally, output is realized qt ∈ {q, q}. Stochastic contingent payment is realized
wt(qt) = {w,w} and payoffs pit and Ut are realized.
2.2.2 Identity and Socialization
Agents only differ in their identity. For all of them, their skills and qualification for work is
the same. They are equally productive in the production of qt. Therefore, P only deals with
moral hazard because the differences in identity does not involve any difference in agents’
6The inclusion of the depreciation cost in every period into the contract, can be interpreted as an
instrument used by P to signal the nature of the incentives offered by him to exert effort from agents:
socialization incentives or pure economic transaction incentives.
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ability for the production of q. A’s identity distribution is assumed to be known by P .
Contracts and incentives offered by the principal may influence agent’s identity. Agent’s
identity can take a value within some closed interval υ ∈ [υ, υ], with υ < υ and υ ∈ R+. In
the model higher identity means lower disutility from effort. Thus, we can anticipate that
an agent with higher identity needs less monetary incentives to exert high effort. However,
the only use of monetary incentives by the principal will involve a higher amount of money
offered to A period after period. This is so because the agent will experience more disutility
from effort as mean as she looses his identity.
What we want to capture with the socialization process7 is P ’s ability to influence and
change agents’ identity carrying out investments in the organization which signal support
and awareness toward agents or workers. Activities, meetings and events organized by the
organization to set its employees organizational minded, participation of workers in organi-
zation’s decisions, to agree organizational objectives jointly with workers, setting organiza-
tion’s internal rules of behavior through democratic processes, the design of workteams of
employees to represent organization in exhibitons, congresses or conferences, training pro-
grams and further education to employees, housing facilities, employees’ children schooling
facilities, high school or university scholarships to employees’ children or the priority to hire
the sons and relatives of organization’s employees might be some good examples of such
investments. Thus, influencing As’ identity with such investments, P lead them to share
the organization’s goals and also to be involved with organization. Then, if P chooses to
invest s0 = S he will switch As’ identity to a higher level and agents will experience less
disutility from effort. But if he decides not to invest, s0 = 0, then agents will switch to
lower identity, they will be lead to conflict and in such situation they will experience high
disutility from exerting effort at workplace.
7See Adler and Bryan [3]
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To make the last more understandable think in the following opposed situations: in the
firm X workers are treated kind by management, supported in their needs not only at work
but also at home and in general. Also they are supported in their personal, professional,
intellectual, or human development, and encouraged to be participative, responsible, collab-
orative and proactive in leading organization to achieve their goals. In the firm Y workers
are monitored, controlled at their workplace, left out of every decision process whithin the
firm, uninformed of organization’s goals and pushed to achieve the desired performance only
with the use of monetary bonuses or punishments. Then itwill be normal to expect that
in the firm X, all its members work harder, more efficiently, more motivated to achieve
high standards of quality in production, and more implicated with customers, dealers and
suppliers than in the firm Y , independently of they are remunerated with the same, even
less, amount of money.
2.2.3 Solving Principal’s Problem
In the game A and P have to renegotiate contracts period after period. This assumption
turns the game into a dynamic re-contracting game. Then the game is able to be solved
implementing the spot contract in each period. In order to make the vector of the spot
contracts as the long term optimal solution we have to assume that the only way to agree
upon a contract is playing the repeated game at every period t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... as a new
game.
Then we can write the P ’s problem as follows,
Max{wt(qt),s0} αt ·
[
E[Rt(qt)|θ0]− E[wt(qt)|θ0]
]]
+
[
(1− αt) ·
[
E[Rt(qt)|θ1]− E[wt(qt)|θ1]
]]− Ct(s0) (2.3)
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Subject to:
E[ut(wt(qt)|θ1)]− ψt(e, υt) > E[ut(wt(qt)|θ0)]− ψt(e, υt) (ICC) (2.4)
E[ut(wt(qt)|θ1)]− ψt(e, υt) > U (PC) (2.5)
ut(w) > 0 ⇐⇒ wt(q) > 0 ⇐⇒ h(ut(w)) > 0 (LLC) (2.6)
(2.3) is the objective function for the principal. P does not know each agent identity. He
only knows agents’ identity distribution. Using this information, he offer a contract that
satisfies the incentive compatibility of agents with average level of identity Et[υt|s0] = υavgt .
Then, only agents with identity above the average level will exert high effort and the rest
shirk. (2.3) is weighted by Pt(υt < υavg|s0) = αt and Pt(υt > υavg|s0) = (1− αt) to capture
this feature of the game. The first, is the probability that the identity of the A is lower
than the average level and the second, is the probability that the agent identity is higher or
equal to the average level, both conditional to P ’s decision s0 = {0, S}.
(2.4) is A’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), and ensures that the agent will
prefer to exert high effort. (2.5) is the A’s participation constraint (PC), and ensures that
the agent will prefer to participate and accept the contract. Finally, (2.6) is a limited liability
constraint (LLC), and ensures that the low payment never falls below zero level.
P ’s problem is solved for each t. The solution for each period t consist in a payment
function w(q) : q −→ w
w(q) =
{
w if q = q
w if q = q
where w > w.8 In the next section we will analyze the conditions under which to offer
socialization incentives and invest in changing As’ identity is optimal for P . From now in
8The calculation of these contingent payments is formally shown in the mathematical appendix, section
A.2
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advance we just show the pair of payments which solves the spot contracting problem. Let
h : u −→ w be the inverse function of the utility function,
h(u) =
{
w if u = u
w if u = u
Applying the variable change w = h(u(w(q))) = (u(w(q)))−1 we have the following pay-
ments,
wt = h(ut(w)) =
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0))
)−1
(2.7)
wt = h(ut(w)) =
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0))
)−1
. (2.8)
As it can be seen, identity lowers w and raises w. To establish a more precise a rela-
tion between identity and incentive payments it is necessary to analyze how identity and
the disutility from effort interacts each with the other. Also it is necessary to analyze
how socialization affects workers’ identity and how these changes affects future stochastic
contingent payments. Once these interactions are established we can calculate principal’s
expected costs and profits and then analyze the possible outcomes of the game.
P can not perfectly discriminate agents attending their identity. P only knows the
distribution of identity. Then, he updates such distribution at every period taking into
account his own past behavior and knowing how the socialization process works. After
updating As’ identity distribution, P is able to offer a new contract based on the expected
identity of agents9. Thus, at every period of the game, P must offer a new pair of expected
9This solution is suboptimal compared with the first best solution where effort level and identity are
perfectly observable. Also is more far away from the first best solution than the second best solution in
which only the effort is unobservable but identity doesn’t play any role.
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payments adjusted to agents’ expected identity,
wt(E[υt|s0]) =
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1
(2.9)
wt(E[υt|s0]) =
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, E[υt|s0])
)−1
. (2.10)
We write the Expected Cost Function for P at each t,
ECt = αt ·
[
θ0wt(E[υt|s0]) + (1− θ0)wt(E[υt|s0])
]
+ (1− αt) ·
[
θ1wt(E[υt|s0]) + (1− θ1)wt(E[υt|s0])
]
+ Ct(s0) (2.11)
Let us use the superscript s0 ∈ {0, S} in ECs0t , in order to differentiate the expected
cost function when P invests in identity s0 = S, from the no-investment case s0 = 0. Then
we have ECSt and EC0t .
EC0t = αt ·
[
θ0wt(E[υt|0]) + (1− θ0)wt(E[υt|0])
]
+ (1− αt) ·
[
θ1wt(E[υt|0]) + (1− θ1)wt(E[υt|0])
]
(2.12)
ECSt = αt ·
[
θ0wt(E[υt|S]) + (1− θ0)wt(E[υt|S])
]
+ (1− αt) ·
[
θ1wt(E[υt|S]) + (1− θ1)wt(E[υt|S])
]
+ Ct(S) (2.13)
Now we introduce into the analysis the earnings of P expressed by the function Rt(qt).
We take the earnings in expected terms due A’s identity hetereogeneity captured by the
conditional distribution function Ft(υt|s0), and also due to the stochastic effort-peformance
relation captured with θi ∈ [0, 1] probabilities. We can express the expected earnings of P
as follows,
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E[Rt(qt)|θi, υt] = αt · E[Rt(qt)|θ0] + (1− αt) · E[Rt(qt)|θ1] =[
αt ·
[
θ0Rt(q¯) + (1− θ0)Rt(q)
]]
+
[
(1− αt) ·
[
θ1Rt(q¯) + (1− θ1)Rt(q)
]]
We also write the Expected Revenue Function conditional to P ’s action,
ER0t =
[
αt ·
[
θ0Rt(q¯) + (1− θ0)Rt(q)
]]
+
[
(1− αt) ·
[
θ1Rt(q¯) + (1− θ1)Rt(q)
]]
ERSt =
[
αt ·
[
θ0Rt(q¯) + (1− θ0)Rt(q)
]]
+
[
(1− αt) ·
[
θ1Rt(q¯) + (1− θ1)Rt(q)
]]
Finally we write the Expected Profits Function, also conditional to P ’s choice over s0,
EΠ0t = ER
0
t − EC0t = αt ·
[
θ0
(
Rt(q¯)− wt(E[υt|0])
)
+ (1− θ0)
(
Rt(q)− wt(E[υt|0])
)]
+ (1− αt) ·
[
θ1
(
Rt(q¯)− wt(E[υt|0])
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
Rt(q)− wt(E[υt|0])
)]
(2.14)
EΠSt = ER
S
t −ECSt = αt ·
[
θ0
(
Rt(q¯)−wt(E[υt|S])
)
+(1−θ0)
(
Rt(q)−wt(E[υt|S])
)]−Ct(s0)
+ (1− αt) ·
[
θ1
(
Rt(q¯)− wt(E[υt|S])
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
Rt(q)− wt(E[υt|S])
)]
+ Ct(S) (2.15)
Identity can be considered another productive asset of the organization that we call Moti-
vational Capital. Confronting P ’s expected profits from using socialization incentives ΠSt ,
with his expected profits from using monetary incentives Π0t , in every period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
we can measure the return of investing in motivational capital. This return is calculated
as the present value of the stream of the differences in expected profits obtained by the
principal. Formally,
CNV mk =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
(2.16)
Where, δt =
(
1
1+r
)t is the discount factor, and r is the discount rate. We say that the
principal has incentives to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk > 0 and we say
that, there is no incentive to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk < 0.
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3 Results
To obtain results first we calculate the spot contract’s cost, the organization profits and
agents utilities for every t = 0, 1, ..., T, .... Then we confront the case in which P chooses
to use socialization incentives to change As’ identity s0 = S with the case in which P
chooses to use only monetary incentives s0 = 0. Finally we present some results drawn from
comparative statics in the last subsection. We also discuss on some conclusions.
3.1 Identity Incentives and Socialization: Investment in Motivational Capital
Consider the case in which the principal chooses to use identity incentives s0 = S. In this
case the principal tries to benefit from investing in motivational capital. The spot payments
at every t are,
wSt (Et[υt|S]) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
(3.1)
wSt (Et[υt|S]) = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|S])
)
(3.2)
At t = 0 payments will be,
wt(E0[υ0]) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψ0(e, E0[υ0])
)
(3.3)
wt(E0[υ0]) = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψ0(e, E0[υ0])
)
(3.4)
Payments at t = 0 are equal independently of using socialization incentives s0 = S or pure
monetary incentives s0 = 0. This is so because at the starting period of the game the
socialization effect can not have occurred yet. For the case of s0 = S we will write the spot
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expected profit function for the principal as follows,
EΠSt = ER
S
t − ECSt = αt ·
[
θ0
(
Rt(q¯)− wt(E[υt|S])
)
+ (1− θ0)
(
Rt(q)− wt(E[υt|S])
)]
+ (1− αt) ·
[
θ1
(
Rt(q¯)− wt(E[υt|S])
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
Rt(q)− wt(E[υt|S])
)]− Ct(S) (3.5)
Now we calculate either, the spot expected utility USt for an Ah who have an identity
υht > υ
avg
t and chooses et = e and also the spot expected utility for an Al who have an
identity υlt 6 υavgt and chooses et = e.
US,ht = θ1
(
U + (1−θ0)
∆θ
ψt
(
e, Et[υt|S]
))
+ (1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt
(
e, Et[υt|S]
))− ψt(e, υht (S)) and, (3.6)
US,lt = θ0
(
U + (1−θ0)
∆θ
ψt
(
e, Et[υt|S]
))
+ (1− θ0)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt
(
e, Et[υt|S]
))− ψt(e, υlt(S)) (3.7)
Finally, we compute the present value of the sum of spot profits and the sum of the spot
utilities, and also the expression which measures the present value of the total surplus TSS
when P action is s0 = S.
ΓS =
T∑
t=0
δtΠSt =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
ERSt − ECSt
]
(3.8)
ΛS =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
αt · US,lt + (1− αt) · US,ht
]
(3.9)
TSS = [ΛSt + Γ
S] (3.10)
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3.2 Agents in Conflict: No-investment in Motivational Capital
In this section we analyze the no investment case or s0 = 0. In this case P does not invest
any amount of resources to promote A’s identity. The mere use of monetary incentives to
control As’ behavior will put agents into conflict toward organization. For this case spot
payments are,
w0t (Et[υt|0]) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
(3.11)
w0t (Et[υt|0]) = h
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
(3.12)
Payments in t = 0 are exactly the same as those described in the previous subsection.
taking the expected costs, EC0t into account we can calculate the spot expected profit Π0t
for P .
EΠ0t = ER
0
t − EC0t = αt ·
[
θ0
(
Rt(q¯)− wt(E[υt|0])
)
+ (1− θ0)
(
Rt(q)− wt(E[υt|0])
)]
+ (1− αt) ·
[
θ1
(
Rt(q¯)− wt(E[υt|0])
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
Rt(q)− wt(E[υt|0])
)]
(3.13)
Then we also can calculate the spot expected utility U0t for an Ah agent who have an
identity υht > υ
avg
t and chooses et = e, and for an agent Al who have an identity υlt 6 υavgt
and chooses et = e.
U0,ht = θ1
(
U + (1−θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
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+ (1− θ1)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, Et[υt|0])
)
− ψt(e, υt(0)) and, (3.14)
U0,lt = θ0
(
U + (1−θ0)
∆θ
ψt
(
e, Et[υt|0]
))
+ (1− θ0)
(
U − θ0
∆θ
ψt
(
e, Et[υt|0]
))− ψt(e, υlt(0)) (3.15)
Also for this case we complete the results showing the present value of the sum of spot
profits and the sum of the spot utilities, and also the expresion which measures the present
value of the social welfare TS0 under the incentive policy s0 = 0.
Γ0 =
T∑
t=0
δtEtΠ
0
t =
T∑
t=0
δt
(
ER0t − EC0t
)
(3.16)
Λ0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
αt · U0,lt + (1− αt)
) · U0,ht ] (3.17)
TS0 =
[
Λ0t + Γ
0
t
]
(3.18)
3.3 Comparative statics
Our model shows that an agent with identity whithin the firm or public organization is
willing to work hard at a high effort for a lower overall pay. This lower incentive requirement
to foster high effort from agents represents a cost advantage of achieving high performance
to the organization. When this cost advantage is high enough, it can be worthwhile for P
to undertake a costly program to promote agents’ identity.
Comparative statics of our model establish under which conditions agents’ identity lead
the organization to find profitable to invest in promoting identity among workers. If in-
culcating identity is low-cost, if output and agents’ effort are weakly correlated (effort is
hard to observe an hard to reward), if agents are especially risk averse or if high effort is
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critical to the organization’s output, then the use of an identity incentive scheme will be
more profitable and more likely to be used.
3.3.1 Identity and Motivational Capital
One very first result that it is straightforward to set, comes from the comparison between
the current value of the sum of spot profits for P when he takes S action and when he takes
0 action. That is, firstly calculating the Current Net Value of the A’s motivational capital
(CNV mk), and then checking if it is positive or negative.This first result is formally shown
in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let T the number of periods of the game. Let K < T be number of periods
large enough to allow socialization or conflict entirely happen. For a δ large enough and if
θ1w
0
K + (1− θ1)w0K > γS + h(U) there exists a threshold t∗ such that,
CNV mk = ΓS − Γ0 = 0 (3.19)
from which the following is concluded:
i. If t∗ 6 T then CNV mk > 0 and P finds profitable to invest in motivational capital
and choose the s0 = S strategy.
ii. If t∗ > T then CNV mk < 0 and P finds profitable not to invest in motivational capital
and choose the s0 = 0 strategy.
Figure 2 illustrate results of proposition 1. Figure 2 shows jointly as a function of time
t, P ’s EΠs0t , ERs0t and ECs0t in either case, when P choose s0 = 0 ors0 = S. A comparison
between EΠSt and EΠ0t and the discounted sum of the difference between these two functions
CNV mkt are shown.
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Figure 2: In the figure, first graph (a) shows the time evolution of ER0t , EC0t and EΠ0t in the case of pure
monetary incentives s0 = 0. T 0 represents the period in which the socialization process is completed and all
the agents present an identity υTS = υ. Second graph (b) shows the time evolution of ERSt , ECSt and EΠSt
in the case of identity incentives s0 = S. TS represents the period in which the conflict process is completed
and all the agents present an identity υT 0 = υ. Third graph (c) confront the time evolution of P’s expected
profits in each case, s0 = 0, and s0 = S. Finally, d) shows the time evolution of the current net value of
the motivational capital CNV mkt , where the profitability threshold labelled with t∗, is the cutoff between
CNV mkt function and x-axis.
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The graph (d) down, on the right side of the figure 2 shows the value of the CNV mk as
a function of time t. Two cases are shown in the graph: socialization incentives s0 = S and
pure monetary incentives s0 = 0. The t∗ threshold determines the critical point that states
the optimal strategy for P .
The motivational capital profitability threshold t∗ is key for P in order to choose the
optimal action. This threshold depends on several variables. The relations given between
these variables and the motivational capital profitability threshold is what determines P ’s
optimal decision in this contracting game. We will focus on the analysis of these relations
in order to draw conditions under which one or another strategy, s0 ∈ {0, S} is optimal.
Now let us compare the total surplus of each strategy s0 ∈ {0, S} of P , to analyze
the cases in which all the members whithin an organisation are better off. The following
proposition shows that the social optimum coincides with the optimal choice of P . This
is so, because incentive compatibility constraint (2.4) and participation constraint (2.5)
ensure that for every choice s0 ∈ {0, S} of P , and every t = 0, 1, . . . , T the expected utility
required by A to exert high effort is the same. The only difference consists in the source
from which A gets the utility. Depending on the P ’s choice over s0 ∈ 0, S, A get utility
from the economic incentive and identity with different weights although the total expected
utility remains constant. Proposition 2 establishes, when a given strategy profile is socially
optimun.
Proposition 2. Let CNV mk = TSS − TS0 = ∑Tt=0 δt [EC0t − ECSt ]. Let (s0, et(υl,ht )) be
the strategy profile that solves the game.
i. If CNV mk > 0, then (S, eh, el) is a Pareto-Efficient strategy profile and Pareto-
Dominates any other possible strategy profile: (S, eh, el), (0, eh, el) or (0, eh, el).
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ii. If CNV mk < 0, then (0, eh, el) is a Pareto Efficient strategy profile and Pareto Domi-
nates any other possible strategy profile: (S, eh, el), (S, eh, el) or (0, eh, el).
Proposition 2 then shows that in case of CNV mk > 0 investing in motivational capital
results optimal for the principal. High effort will be optimal for the agent whose identity
is higher than average eh. The agent whose identity is low will shirk el.Then, (S, eh, el)
is the equilibrium strategy profile for the game and there is no chances to improve any
of the players without necessarily worsening at least one of the others. Analogously, if
CNV mk < 0, then using pure monetary rewards is optimal for the principal. High effort
choice will be optimal for the agent whose identity is high eh. The agent whose identity is
low will shirk el. Then, (0, e) is the equilibrium strategy profile for the game, there is no
chances to improve any player of the game without necessarily worsening at least one of the
others.
3.3.2 The Role of the Depreciation Rate of Motivational Investment.
Profitability threshold t∗ and time depreciation of the motivational investment that the
principal must face to run a socialization incentives program γ, provide another interesting
insight. Once the entire socialization effect or conflict effect has happened, principal finds
crucial to balance two opposite effects: the higher profits from having agents with high
identity in contrast with the additional costs he must face to run a socialization incentive
policy. The first effect establish that θ1(R − w0t ) + (1 − θ1)(R − w0t ) < θ1(R − wSt ) + (1 −
θ1)(R− wSt ).
But, to lead agents’ identity towards υt = υ, P must face the consequent depreciation
cost of using socialization incentives Ct(S) = γS, in t = 1, 2, . . . . Then depreciation cost rate
γ becomes a key parameter to study the profitability of investing in motivational capital.
As γ takes values closer to one, t∗ becomes larger and is less likely for the principal to find
profitable to invest in motivational capital.
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In other words, in a context in which a principal P , who have to reinvest a sufficiently
high amount of resources Ct(S) = γS in t = 1, 2, . . . , would not find that investment prof-
itable because it would never be compensated by the savings generated from lower incentive
requirements. To illustrate this case, assume that there is a maximum depreciation rate γ+
above of which the Current Net Value of motivational capital never will reach a positive
value. Then, investing in motivational capital will not be profitable at all. Proposition 3
summarize this result.
Proposition 3. Let K < T be number of periods large enough to allow socialization or
conflict entirely happens.Where υK = υ if s0 = S and υK = υ if s0 = 0. Taking S as
constant, if γ > θ1w
0
K+(1−θ1)w0K−h(U)
S
, then CNV mk < 0 for all t = 1, 2, ... and P never will
find profitable to invest in motivational capital.
Figure 3: Negative Current Net Value of the Motivational Capital, CNV mk < 0 due to high cost
of depreciation γS.
Intuitively proposition 3 states that, there is no reason to spend resources to change
workers’ identity, neither in the short run nor in the long run, whenever As’ identity is not
large enough to cause an advantage in payments which offset the cost of promoting iden-
tity
(
E[w0t − wSt |θi, αt] < Ct(S)
)
. This case have sense for organizations and jobs in which
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workers have to perform in bad work environment, doing nasty, exhausting and/or boring
tasks, the work implicitly involves conflict of interests between the members of organization
and is costly to change their identity.
However, we are more interested in the case in which identity is large enough to overcome
the cost of generating it E[w0t − wSt |θi, αt] > γS at some time period t′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . }. In
this case P ’s expected savings from identity when is strictly increasing and bounded. Taken
together with the assumption of a constant depreciation cost, γS we have that the optimality
of investing in motivational capital becomes a matter of time. The time that the organization
has to wait in order to get profits from identity changes, CNV mk > 0, will be a function of
the depreciation rate value γ. Proposition 4 shows such a relation.
Proposition 4. Let j = {A,B} be two alternative actuations to foster agents’ iden-
tity with γA and γB associated depreciation costs such that γA < γB. Let t = t′j, t′j ∈
{0, 1, . . . } be the time periods in which the change in agents’ identity reach a value such
that E
[
w0t′j
− wSt′j |θi, αt
]
> γjS. Let t = t∗j , t∗j ∈ {0, 1, . . . } be the number of time periods in
which CNV mkj = 0. Then t′A < t′B and t∗A < t∗B.
Figure 4 illustrates the result of the proposition 4. In situations in which investing
in motivational capital is profitable. Then, those actuations or investments with higher
depreciation costs will require a higher number of periods in order to generate positive
returns. In other words, when changing agents’ identity requires more resources (obstinate
agents, distrustful agents,. . . ), investing in motivational capital will be less likely to be
optimal. Organizations with high rotation rate of employees is a particular case of this
result.
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Figure 4: Current Net Value of Motivational Capital with two different depreciation rates γA and
γB such that γA < γB.
3.3.3 Effort Effectiveness and Motivational Capital
The parameter θi ∈ [0, 1] measuresA’s effort effectiveness, where i = 0, 1 serve to distinguish
low effort action and high effort action respectively. θi measures the probability of achieving
high performance conditional on A’s effort choice. We say that θi is informative if θ1 > θ0.
As mean as the value of θ0 approaches to θ1, P must offer higher incentives to force A
to exert high effort. This is what literature in economics of information calls agent’s rent
extraction power. In words, to make shirking costly enough in order to incentivize A to high
effort will result more expensive as mean as performance is more noisy signal of effort.
Then pure monetary incentives results too expensive when the signal used to link pay-
ments to effort is hard to observe and hard to reward. In such cases, P will find optimal
to invest in motivational capital s0 = S more likely. Although investing in motivational
capital is costly Ct(S), P will reduce payment costs because workers with identity do not
need monetary incentives to exert high effort (at least not as high as those of the workers
without identity). If θ0 implies higher monetary incentives, then potential savings from
implementing s0 = S strategy will be very high and the current net value, CNV mk becomes
positive earlier.
28
Proposition 5. Higher values of θ0 implies higher values of CNV mkt for every t = 0, 1, . . . , T, . . . .
Then, investing in motivational capital is more profitable for P, when performance is a more
random signal about A’s effort level.
Proposition 5 shows that as higher is the probability of achieving high performance
when the effort is low, p(q = q|e = e) = θ0, then more profitable will be for P to invest in
motivational capital s0 = S10.
Figure 5: Information and motivational capital. As figure shows, values of θ0 closer to θ1 makes
motivational investments more profitable for P. A worse signal of effort increasesA’s rent extraction
power so much that the expected savings from having workers with identity exceed the costs of
investing in otivatonal capital. With υt = υ the low payment h(ut, υ) goes to 0 (LLC) when θ0
approaches θ1 and the high payment h(ut, υ) goes to infinity. However, if υt = υ the payment
remains constat independently of the value of θ0.
Figure 5 shows how the high payment grow towards infinity and the low payment falls
up to 0 (LLC) as θ0 approaches to θ1. However, having agents with identity implies that
no incentive payments are needed to elicit them to exert high effort and then, the savings
10This result is consistent with what Akerlof and Kranton (2005) state about identity as motivating for
work. [. . . ] a change in identity is the ideal motivator if, [. . . ] the effort of a worker is either hard to
observe or hard to reward.(p. 10)
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from having workers with identity will be so large that compensate the cost of socialization
investments.
3.3.4 Agents’ Risk Aversion and Motivational Capital
In the model, agents are risk-averse with respect to their monetary earnings. They perceive
utility from incentives which consists in contingent payments wt(qt). But agents also ex-
perience utility from identity. As mean as agent’s identity increases, fewer incentives are
required in order to encourage him to exert high effort. Less variation in payments indicates
that A must be compensated with a lower risk premium. Then, as As’ identity increases,
incentives fall and this constitutes another cost-saving source for the organization.
Proposition 6 formally states that investing in motivational capital is more profitable in
the presence of risk-averse A.
Proposition 6. Let A1 and A2 be a pair of agents with υ1 and υ2 identity respectively. If
agents are risk-averse and υ1 < υ2, then incentives will be lower in the case of A2 than in
the case of A1. Therefore t∗1 > t∗2 and P will find more profitable to invest in motivational
capital when agents are more risk averse.
The intuition behind this result is that incentives must be greater in order to encourage
high effort from agents without identity. Lower identity enlarge the different between low
w and high w incentive payments. Given that A is risk averse, the risk premium that P
should offer to reach the certainty equivalent will result higher. Analogously, agents with
identity will require fewer incentives to exert high effort. Consequently, an agent with high
identity has to bear a lower variance over payments and has to be compensated with a lower
risk premium. Thus identity generates savings for P .
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4 Conclusion
We introduce the notion of identity in a model of principal agent with moral hazard. Incen-
tives beyond the money can be an alternative option to money incentivization in order to
encourage agents towards exerting high effort. The incorporation of identity has been done
on the basis of an extense literature on identity11. Our approach has to do with what Fehr
et al. [16] summed up with the following quote:
[...] This approach is a first step to developing richer models that may become
part of “behavioral contract theory.”
Incorporating the notion of identity in a principal agent model and also incorporating the
ability for the principal to manage agents’ identity, the present work has shown under which
conditions spending resources in changing agents’ identity is profitable for organizations.
These conditions are, for instance, the lenght of the contracts offered, the total cost of
investing in changing agents’ identity for the principal, the informative value of the signal
used to observe and incentivize effort or the degree of agents’ risk aversion.
Taking all into account, what we conclude from this work is: an initial investment
in motivational capital using incentives beyond the money though costly at inception, will
result more effective to control public organizations expenditure and fostering their efficiency
and productivity. Then, Governments, political advisors and public organisations should
take into account and incorporate these findings to the policy design. For instance, from
the proposition 1 a planner could conclude that monetary incentives are the best way to
achieve a specifical goal in the short term. However for the long term goals: quality,
efficiency, effectivenes, research and develop results, then proposition 1 establishes, that a
11See for instance Akerlof and Kranton [1, 2] and Benabou and Tirole [6].
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change in identity and investments in motivational capital is the most profitable action for
the organisation.
Finally, wherever the principal in the public organization is politically designated, their
time horizon will be the legislative time period and then it is more likely that they are
focused in the short term goals. Thus, they will have a willingness to chosse pure monetary
rewards as incentive schemes, despite in the long term the best choice is the investment in
motivational capital given that workers’ contracts are much longer that legislative piece of
time. Anyway these conclusions are interesting future research questions which, should be
tested and studied in depth in the future.
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Socialization: the Evolution of Identity Distribution.
Let F (υt|s0) be the probability distribution function of the As’ identity υt, where υt ∈ [υ, υ],
υ < υ and υ, υ ∈ R+.
Assume that for any decision choice of s0, F0(υ0|S) = F0(υ0|0) = F0(υ0). Socialization
will reflect evolution of identity distribution through time, conditional to the choice of s0.
We separate the socialization into two cases: socialization and conflict. The distribution
of identity will evolve oppositely depending on the P ’s s0 investement strategy.
Thus for every value of υt = υ∗ when s0 = 0 the distribution function at any period
t is stochastically dominated by the distribution function of the previous period t − 1.
Alternatively for every value of υt when s0 = S the distribution function at any period t
dominates stochastically the distribution function of the previous period t−1. This property
is formally written as follows,
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Figure 6: Identity. Stochastic Dominance.
Ft(υt = υ
∗|0) > Ft−1(υt−1 = υ∗|0) > · · · > F0(υ0)
> · · · > Ft−1(υt−1 = υ∗|S) > Ft(υt = υ∗|S)
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Figure 7: Identity. Time Evolution of Densities.
Finally assume that Ft(υt|S) converges to put all the probability on the upper bound of
the identity υt = υ, and Ft(υt|0) converges to put all the probability on the lower bound of
the identity υt = υ.
lim
t→TS
Ft(υt|S) = λ where λ =
{
1 if υ = υ
0 otherwise
for some T S ∈ [0,∞) and,
lim
t→T 0
Ft(υt|0) = 1, for every υ ∈ [υ, υ], and for some T 0 ∈ [0,∞).
Let Et[υt|s0] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of υt conditional to the
incentive policy s0. Implications of the s0 conditioned stochastic dominance on Et[υt|s0]:
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[υt+1|0] < Et[υt|0]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[υt+1|S] > Et[υt|S]
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∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[υt|0] < Et[υt|S]
Where,
Et[υt|s0] =
∫ υ
υ
υtf(υt|s0)dυt
A.2 Problem Solving
Let us now to simplify the notation in order to make algebraic operations easier. We relabel
some variables of the model in order to do that. All changes are summarized in table 1.
Utility from monetary payments: ut(w) = u ; ut(w) = u
Disutility from effort: ψt(e, υt(s0)) = ψt
P ’s revenue function: Rt(q) = R ; Rt(q) = R
P ’s revenue variation: ∆Rt ≡ R−R
Payments variability: ∆wSt = wSt − wSt
∆w0t = w
0
t − w0t
Change of variables: w = h(u) ; w = h(u)
Probability variation: ∆θ = (θ1 − θ0)
Reservation utility: U
Table 1: Notational simplification
Then we can rewrite the P ’s problem as follows:
Max{wt(qt),s0} αt ·
(
θ0
(
R− h(u))− (1− θ0) (R− h(u)))
+ (1− αt) ·
(
θ1
(
R− h(u))− (1− θ1) (R− h(u)))− Ct(s0) (A.1)
Subject to
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u− ψt > θ0u+ (1− θ0)u (ICC) (A.2)
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u− ψt > U (PC) (A.3)
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u > 0 (LLC) (A.4)
Note that the P ’s objective function is now strictly concave in u and u, because h(·) is
strictly convex. The function u−1 = h(u) gives back ex post the monetary payments from
utility levels. We have now linear constraints and a nonempty interior of the constrained
set and therefore the problem is concave and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are sufficient and
necessary for characterizing optimality.
Letting λ and µ be the non-negative multipliers associated respectively with the (ICC)
and (PC) constraints. First-order conditions of this problem yield:
1
u′(w)
= µ+ λ
∆θ
θ1
(A.5)
1
u′(w)
= µ− λ ∆θ
1− θ1 (A.6)
The equations (9) and (10) jointly with (6) and (7) form a system of four equations with
four variables (w,w, µ, λ) which allows us to calculate the solution. Multiplying (9) by θ1
and (10) by (1− θ1) and adding those two modified equations, we obtain,
µ =
θ1
u′(w)
+
1− θ1
u′(w)
> 0 (A.7)
Hence, µ > 0 and the participation constraint (7) is binding. Using (11) and (9), we
also obtain,
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λ =
(1− θ1)θ1
∆θ
(
1
u′(w)
− 1
u′(w)
)
> 0 (A.8)
And the incentive compatibility constraint (6) is also binding. Thus we can obtain
immediately the values of u(w) and u(w) by solving a system with two equations and two
unknowns. The result is shown below,
ut(w) = U +
(1− θ0)
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0)) (A.9)
ut(w) = U − θ0
∆θ
ψt(e, υt(s0)). (A.10)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We want to establish that, in case in which w0T > γ ·S+h(U) always there exists a threshold
t∗ ∈ {0, . . . , T, . . . } for which the following equality holds.
CNV mk = ΓS − Γ0 = 0 (A.11)
We can rewrite the above expression in the following way,
CNV mk =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
= 0
As we know, in the first period of the game t = 0 the elicit high effort using incentive
payments that P must offer to elicit A to exert high effort is exactly equal independently
of using socialization incentives (s0 = S) or pure monetary rewards (s0 = 0). This is so
because in the first period neither socialization nor conflict cause any effect. Therefore, in
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t = 0 we have that (w00, w00) = (wS0 , wS0 ) and then we know that,
CNV mk =
0∑
t=0
δ0
[
EΠS0 − EΠ00
]
= −S < 0
In words, using socialization incentive scheme has negative returns t = 0. But in subse-
quent periods t = 1, 2, . . . socialization and conflict processes start to work,
Socialization:
d
[
θiw
S
t + (1− θi)wSt
]
dt
< 0
Conflict:
d
[
θiw
0
t + (1− θi)w0t
]
dt
> 0 for i = 0, 1.
And this means that at t = 1, 2, . . .
dEΠSt
dt
> 0 and
dEΠ0t
dt
< 0,
therefore,
d
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
dt
> 0
Without loss of generality assume that the game reaches the period t = K for which the
processes of socialization (in case that P chooses s0 = S) and conflict (in case that P
chooses s0 = 0) are completed. Let T S the number of periods necessary for agents to
reach the maximun level of identity due to socialization: υTS = υ. Analogously, let T 0
the number of periods necessary for agents to reach the minimum level of identity due to
conflict: υT 0 = υ. Then K > T S and K > T 0.
Then at period t = K disutility from effort for an agent with identity υK = υ will be
zero ψK(eK , υ) = 0. This involves that in order to elicit from her high effort the principal
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should offer to him a dupla of incentive payments such that wSK = wSK = wSK . Formally,
wSK = h
U + (1− θ0)
∆θ
·
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψK(e, υ)
 = h (U) = h
U − θ0
∆θ
·
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψK(e, υ)
 = wSK
Analogously, to incentivize an agent with identity υK = υ, the principal should offer to him
a dupla of incentive payments like the following,
w0K = h
U + (1− θ0)
∆θ
·
=Ψ︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψK(e, υ)
 = h(U + (1− θ0)
∆θ
·Ψ
)
w0K = h
U − θ0
∆θ
·
=Ψ︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψK(e, υ)
 = h(U − θ0
∆θ
·Ψ
)
We also know that, the probabilities in t = K of having full identity υK = υ or be in conflict
υK = υ, conditional to s0 = S and s0 = 0 are respectively the following,
PK(υK = υ|S) = 1 and PK(υK = υ|0) = 1,
At this point there is no agent who shirk because the average level of identity, in each case,
matches exactly υK = υ or υK = υ. Then all the agents within the organization will have
and expected identity level of EK [υK |S] = υ or EK [υK |0] = υ respectively.
All the above lead us to write the P ’s expected profits conditional to chosen incentives
s0 ∈ {0, S}:
EΠSK = θ1R + (1− θ1)R− wSK − γS
EΠ0K = θ1
(
R− w0K) + (1− θ1)(R− w0K)
In the following we calculate the difference in expected profits due to selected incentive
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policies at the point of socialization and conflict effects are completed.
EΠSK − EΠ0K =
(
θ1w
0
K + (1− θ1)w0K
)− (wSK + γS)
For proposition 1 we focus our attention in the case of θ1w0K + (1 − θ1)w0K > γS + h(U).
Also we know that wSK = h(U) and therefore we have,
EΠSK − EΠ0K =
( >γS+h(U)︷ ︸︸ ︷
θ1w
0
K + (1− θ1)w0K
)− ( wSK︸︷︷︸
=h(U)
+γS
)
> 0
As we have seen up to this point, CNV mk starts being negative at t = 0. Also we know
that once P ’s selected incentive policy has completed his associated effect, socialization or
conflict, the subsequent added values to the CNV mk will remain positive period after period
up to the game ends. We know also, that socialization and conflict processes imply that
added values to the CNV mk will be increasing in time. Then at some period t = tˆ < K
EΠS
tˆ
= EΠ0
tˆ
.
CNV mk =
tˆ∑
t=0
δt
[
EΠS0 − EΠ00
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
T∑
t=tˆ+1
δt
[
EΠS0 − EΠ00
]
Up to t = tˆ, CNV mk will be decreasing and negative but limited. After the game overcomes
t = tˆ and up to t = T , CNV mk will be increasing and limited only by the length of the
game. That is, the positive value of CNV mk will find its limit determined by the total
number of periods t = T of the game.
Let us to assume the following limited negative value of the current net value of moti-
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vational capital in t = tˆ,
CNV mk =
tˆ∑
t=0
δt
[
EΠS0 − EΠ00
]
= −M where M ∈ R++
Assume for simplicity that tˆ+ 1 = K. Then we have that,
EΠSK − EΠ0K =
(
θ1w
0
K + (1− θ1)w0K
)− (wSK + γS) = m where m ∈ R++
Then for a discount factor large enough δ > M−m
M
we have that,
∞∑
t=K+1
δtm−M > 0
then at some period t∗ ∈ (K,∞),
t∗∑
t=K+1
δtm−M = 0
and therefore CNV mkt∗ = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Immediate by comparison of (3.10) and (3.18), joint with the application of Proposition 1.
Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Inmediate. If, at the limit, there is no positive return from changing agents identity at any
period t ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . . , T, . . . }, then the initial investmet never becomes profitable and the
best choice is to not invest any amount to change agents identity. Proof available from the
authors upon request.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof available from the authors upon request.
A.7 Proof of proposition 5.
Preliminary assumptions over θi:
P (qt = q|et = e) = θ1 P (qt = q|et = e) = θ0
P (qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ1 P (qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ0
Assume also that performance is an informative signal about effort, θ1 > θ0. Results
show that the parameter θi affects payments wt = {w,w}.
Let us to analyze the impact of θ0 on both payments,
ws0t (Et[υt|s0]) = h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
(θ1 − θ0)ψt(e, Et[υt|s0])
)
(A.12)
ws0t (Et[υt|s0]) = h
(
U − θ0
(θ1 − θ0)ψt(e, Et[υt|s0])
)
. (A.13)
By definition h′(·) > 0 and h′′(·) > 0. Let us to recall ψt(e, Et[υt|s0]) = Ψ to simplify
notation. Then,
dw(q)
dθ0
= h′(u)
∂
(
U − θ0
θ1−θ0 Ψ
)
∂θ0
= −h′(u)
[ Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)2
]
< 0.
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The sign of this first derivative of h(u(w)) from θ0 is negative for any value θ0 ∈ [0, θ1].
Then the low stochastic payment depends negatively from θ0
Now we calculate the second derivative of w from θ0,
d2w(q)
dθ20
=
[
− h′′(u) ·
( Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)2
)2]
+ [−h′(u)] ·
( 2Ψθ1
(θ1 − θ0)3
)
< 0
The second derivative is negative. Then, the value of the utility experienced from the low
payment, decreases more quickly on θ0 as mean as the latter increases. Is straightforward
to se that in the limit the low payment w converges to −∞ when θ0 goes to θ1
lim
θ0→θ1
h
(
U − θ0Ψ
θ1 − θ0
)
= −∞
On the other hand, the first derivative on θ0 of the high payment is as follows,
dw(q)
dθ0
= h′(u) · ∂u(w(q))
∂θ0
= h′(u) ·
∂
(
U + (1−θ0)Ψ
θ1−θ0
)
∂θ0
= h′(u) ·Ψ (1− θ1)
(θ1 − θ0)2 > 0
The sign of the first derivative in the case of high payment, is possitive. Then, as mean as
the value of θ0 increases, the high payment also increases. The sign of the second derivative
show whether the payment increases faster or slower as mean as θ0 increases.
d2w(q)
dθ20
=
[
h′′(u) ·
∂
(
U+
(1−θ0)Ψ
θ1−θ0
)
∂θ0
]
·
(
Ψ (1−θ1)
(θ1−θ0)2
)
+
[
h′(u) · 2Ψ
(θ1−θ1)3
]
=
= h′′(u) ·
(
Ψ (1−θ1)
(θ1−θ0)2
)2
+ h′(u) · 2Ψ
(θ1−θ1)3 > 0
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Figure 8: Payments and the informative value of the signal
Is straightforward to see that the high payment is increasing in θ0 and this positive
relation is also increasing in θ0. Then, when θ0 value converges to θ1, the high stochastic
optimal payment converges to ∞.
lim
θ0→θ1
h
(
U +
(1− θ0)Ψ
θ1 − θ0
)
=∞ (A.14)
We know that for a given value θ0 = θˆ0 enough close to θ1, w will fall below 0. Then,
applying LLC (2.6), for all θ0 ∈ [θˆ0, θ1) we have w = 0 and, (A.14).
In the model an agent with υt = υ experiences no-disutility from effort and he will not
need incentives to exert high effort.
ψt(e, υ) = 0 (A.15)
Consequently payments will not depend on the effectiveness of the signal θi because
the agent will always choose e = e action in every t in exchange of a constant payment
wSt = h(U). Then,
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lim
θ0→θ1
[
αt ·
(
θ0w
0
t + (1− θ0)w0t
)
+ (1− αt)
(
θ1w
0
t + (1− θ1)w0t
)− wSt ] =∞ (A.16)
and (A.16) proves the proposition 5.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
First let us to recall some assumptions of the model and some properties of functions of
the model. Let us start with ψt(et, υt). We now that, this function is continuous and
differentiable, and depends negatively on A’s identity
ψ′υ =
∂ψt(et, υt)
∂υt
< 0 (A.17)
Then, for every pair of agents i = A,B with υt,A and υt,B identities respectively, where
υt,A > υt,B whe have that,
ψt(e, υt,A) = ΨA < ΨB = ψt(e, υt,B)
ψt(e, υt,A) = ψt(e, υt,B) = 0
As’ identity affects P ’s expected costs,
ECt = αt ·
[
θ0 ·
h(u)=w︷ ︸︸ ︷
h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
(θ1 − θ0) · ψ(et, υt)
)
+(1− θ0) ·
h(u=w)︷ ︸︸ ︷
h
(
U +
−θ0
(θ1 − θ0) · ψ(et, υt)
)]
+(1−αt) ·
[
θ1 ·h
(
U +
(1− θ0)
(θ1 − θ0) · ψ(et, υt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(u)=w
+(1−θ1)h
(
U +
−θ0
(θ1 − θ0) · ψ(et, υt)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(u)=w
]
+Ct(s0)
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Let ECrt the P ’s expected cost function when A are risk averse. We differentiate ECrt
with respect to υt,
∂ECrt
∂υt
=
αt
(θ1 − θ0) ·
[
θ0(1− θ0) · h′(u) · ψ′υ − θ0(1− θ0) · h′(u) · ψ′υ
]
+
(1− αt)
(θ1 − θ0) ·
[
θ1 · (1− θ0) · h′(u) · ψ′υ − θ0(1− θ1) · h′(u) · ψ′υ
]
(A.18)
We know that agents are risk averse: u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. The inverse of utility function
h(u(w)) = w is defined in order to calculate payments. By risk aversion we have that h′ > 0
and h′′ > 0. Then for u > u we have that,
h′(u) > h′(u)
Also we know that performance is an informative signal of effort: θ1 > θ0, and then
θ1(1− θ0) > θ0(1− θ1). Therefore, joint with (A.17), it is straight forward to see that,
∂ECrt
∂υt
< 0
The interpretation of (A.18) is that as agents’ identity increases, the cost of incentivize them
to exert high effort decreases.
Let us now to use as benchmark the risk neutrality case to confront with the risk aversion
case. If agents are risk neutral, then u(w) = k ·w with k > 0. Then u′ = k > 0 and u′′ = 0.
Let ECnt the P ’s expected cost function when A are risk neutral. We differentiate ECrt
with respect to υt,
∂ECnt
∂υt
=
(1− αt)
(θ1 − θ0) · k · ψ
′
υ · (θ0 − θ1) (A.19)
Which is also negative,
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∂ECnt
∂υt
< 0
It is immediate to see that the negative effect of the identity on P ’s cost is always of
higher magnitude when agents are risk averse.
∣∣∣∂ECrt
∂υt
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂ECnt
∂υt
∣∣∣ (A.20)
And then, in presence of risk averse agents, As’ identity diminishes P ’s expected costs
more than in the case of risk neutral agents.
Next, let us to analyze the consequences of this on CNV mkt . Conditional to P ’s choice
on s0 ∈ {0, S}, As’ identity will increase or decrease, and consequently, the expected costs
will decrease or increase along time.
dυt(S)
dt
> 0⇒ dECt
dt
< 0
dυt(0)
dt
< 0⇒ dECt
dt
> 0
From (A.20) we know that,
∣∣∣d[ECrt ]
dt
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣d[ECnt ]
dt
∣∣∣⇒ d[EΠrt ]
dt
>
d[EΠnt ]
dt
if s0 = S
d[ECrt ]
dt
>
d[ECnt ]
dt
⇒
∣∣∣d[EΠrt ]
dt
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣d[EΠnt ]
dt
∣∣∣ if s0 = 0
And,
CNV mk,rt > CNV
mk,n
t
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For every t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . as we want to proof.
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